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Abstract
In this paper a simultaneous-equations model of ﬁrm closing and wage
determination is speciﬁed in order to analyse how wages adjust to unfavor-
able product demand shocks that raise the risk of displacement through
ﬁrm closing, and to what extent an exogenous wage change aﬀects the
exit likelihood. Using a longitudinal matched worker-ﬁrm data set from
Portugal, the estimation results suggest that, under the existence of non-
competitive rents, the fear of job loss leads workers to accept wage con-
cessions, even though a compensating diﬀerential for the ex ante risk of
displacement might exist. A novel result that emerges from this study
is that ﬁrms with a higher incidence of minimum wage earners are more
vulnerable to adverse shocks due to their inability to adjust wages down-
ward. Indeed, minimum wage restrictions were seen to increase the failure
rates.
JEL classiﬁcation: J31; J65
Keywords: wages; displacement risk; concessions5
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down, while startups account for one-sixth of annual job creation. In Portugal,
annual job ﬂows produced by both plant births and plant deaths account for
almost half of total gross employment ﬂows (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001).
The literature on ﬂows of jobs is, however, mostly employment accounting,
without any direct information about the magnitude of the wage or output elas-
ticities of employment changes through the births and deaths of establishments
(or growth or contraction in existing establishments).
Recently, a considerable number of studies examined how the wages of dis-
placed workers evolve (over a long-term period) in comparison with the wages
of workers who were not displaced [see, among others, Jacobson et al. (1993),
Stevens (1997) and Margolis (1999)]. Nonetheless, few studies have yet ana-
lyzed how exogenous wage changes aﬀect the probability of displacement. In
fact, the theoretical and empirical research on the role of wages on plant clos-
ings is remarkably sparse. Most of the empirical literature on plant closings has
concentrated on the eﬀect of unions in the probability that a ﬁrm (plant) shuts
down.1
Hamermesh (1988) was the ﬁrst to address this issue explicitly, oﬀering a
model in which workers and ﬁrms contract over wages and employment proba-
bilities.2
Based on the theoretical framework of Hamermesh’s model (1988, 1991 and
1993), this study will examine how wages adjust to a negative demand shock
that raises the risk of displacement through ﬁrm closing and to what extent
wages aﬀect the exit likelihood. The role of a mandatory minimum wage on the
ﬁrm’s exit decision will also be analyzed.
This work attempts to contribute to the empirical literature on wages and
the risk of displacement on three distinct grounds. The ﬁrst is related to the
use of a simultaneous-equations approach in order to account for the possible
endogeneity of wages and the probability of displacement. As it seems clear that
an increase in the ﬁrm’s failure rate may aﬀect wage changes because it raises
the risk of displacement, it also seems clear that a wage change may aﬀect the
exit likelihood because it reduces, all else being equal, the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability.
Second, this study makes a signiﬁcant contribution by examining the eﬀect
of a mandatory minimum wage on the failure rate. Despite the great eﬀort
dedicated to research on the eﬀect of minimum wages on unemployment, namely,
youth unemployment, we are not aware of any study that explicitly looks at the
relationship between minimum wages and ﬁrms’ exits. Are ﬁrms with a higher
proportion of minimum wage earners more vulnerable to product shocks due to
their inability to adjust wages downward?
Finally, the third is related to the use of an appropriate and representative
data set to analyze the relationship between wages and the risk of displacement.
In fact, the Portuguese data from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) can be described
1See Addison et al. (2004) for a summary of the international evidence of union eﬀects
on plant closings for Britain and the United States. Their own study is about the eﬀects of
worker representation on plant closings in Germany.
2Two other notable exceptions are the studies of Dunne and Roberts (1990) and Blanch-
ﬂower (1991).
1 Introduction
The extent of job destruction and, in particular, ﬁrm closing and job loss due
to sector reallocation, has been a matter of great concern in recent years, with
empirical research on gross job and worker ﬂows experiencing a tremendous
growth over the past two decades. The studies on the decomposition of net
employment ﬂows emphasize the importance of job creation and job destruction
through the entry and exit of ﬁrms. According to Davis et al. (1996), about
one-fourth of annual job destruction in the U.S. takes places at plants that shut6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1159
February 2010
as a longitudinally matched worker-ﬁrm sample with a rich set of information
on workers’ characteristics, their wages, and their work environment. This will
enable us to address a number of questions that cannot be adequately answered
in the absence of ﬁrm or worker data.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 3 describes the empirical counterpart of the simultaneous-
equations model of ﬁrm closing and wages. In Section 4 the data set is described
and the basic hypothesis regarding which factors should matter for exit and the
wage determinants are also discussed. Section 5 reports the empirical results
and some tantalizing robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Hamermesh’s theoretical model (1988, 1991 and 1993) constitutes the basis of
our own approach. Hamermesh modeled the relationship between wage changes
and the probability of job displacement due to plant closing, in order to deter-
mine the necessary wage concessions to keep plants from closing.3 The model
is set within a contract theory framework in which workers contract with their
employers for a package that includes a probability that the job will exist and
a wage premium above the entry-level wage (reservation wage). In fact, when
workers sort themselves among ﬁrms, one of the risks they consider is that
exogenous product-market shocks may cause the ﬁrm to close down.
The idea underlying the model is that since an internal labor market may
operate with employers and employees sharing the rents originated by ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital, the adjustment to negative shocks may be partially
absorbed through wage concessions.
Thus, in a given period t, the level of wages includes two components and
can be deﬁned as:
Wt = WRt + (Wt − WRt)
The ﬁrst component corresponds to the reservation wage, WRt, the market wage
rate that makes the worker indiﬀerent between that ﬁrm and at least another
one. The reservation wage includes a compensating diﬀerential for the ex ante
expected probability of closing. The second component, Wt−WRt, corresponds
to the deviation of wages over the reservation wage and should reﬂect the returns
to ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investments.
Two main predictions emerge from Hamermesh’s model. The ﬁrst, points to
a negative relationship between the excess of wages over the reservation wage
and the probability of closing, suggesting that shocks that increase the proba-
bility of displacement reduce the magnitude of the wage increase. The second,
points to the existence of a positive relationship between the reservation wage
and the probability of closure due to the existence of compensating diﬀerentials
for the ex ante risk of displacement.
3For a more detailed approach see Hamermesh (1988, 1991 and 1993).7
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In order to disentangle between these two eﬀects, i. e., to analyze how wages
adjust to unfavorable shocks that raise the risk of displacement through ﬁrm
closing, and to what extent an exogenous wage change aﬀects the exit likeli-
hood, a simultaneous-equations model of ﬁrm closing and wage determination
is adopted in this study.
In this framework wages are determined through negotiation between the
ﬁrm and its workers. It is also assumed that the existence of product/labor
market power generates rents that can be shared by employees in the form of
higher wages. From the perspective of the contractual relationship between
employers and employees, the existence of non-competitive rents may be viewed
as a buﬀer that can cushion against negative shocks and, thus, partially insulate
the ﬁrm from unfavorable market conditions. The possibility of wage concessions
is, of course, precluded if workers are paid legal minimum wages.
The basic model consists of two equations. In essence, the ﬁrst deﬁnes the
probabilistic event of a displacement due to plant closure. This equation is
a discrete labor demand function that describes the impact of wages on the
probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing and, thus, on employment.
The eﬀect of wage levels on the probability of ﬁrm closing may be ambiguous.
One would expect that, all else being equal, ﬁrms with lower wages would have
higher expected proﬁts, and thus be more likely to survive. But, in the absence
of proper productivity measures, high wages may simply be viewed as mirroring
high productivity and, thus, there might be no correlation.
The second equation of the model is a wage bargaining function. The market-
wage equation allows us to examine whether, under imperfect competition in
the labor market, the risk of being ﬁred due to ﬁrm closing leads workers to
accept wage moderation in order to avoid the ﬁrm’s shutdown. This hypothesis
is consistent with the idea that pay is ﬁxed in a bilateral bargain where the fear
of unemployment acts to weaken workers’ bargaining position [Blanchﬂower
(1991)].
3 The Empirical Model of Firm Closing and
Wages
3.1 Purpose
The empirical model of ﬁrm closing and wages presented in this Section attempts
to grasp three important elasticities. The ﬁrst will give a measure of how wages
adjust to a negative demand shock that raises the probability of displacement
through ﬁrm closing - elasticity of wages with respect to the probability of
ﬁrm closure. The second will determine how wages themselves aﬀect the exit
likelihood - quasi-elasticity of ﬁrm closure with respect to wages. The third,
measures the eﬀect of a mandatory minimum wage on the failure rate - quasi-
elasticity of ﬁrm closure with respect to minimum wage incidence.8
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At this point the reasons that led to choosing a model of ﬁrm closing and
not plant closing should be mentioned. The option to use information at the
ﬁrm level instead of at the plant level is justiﬁed by two main reasons. First,
the important management bargaining decisions in a multi-plant ﬁrm are made
at the corporate level, not at the plant, and reﬂect the priorities of the ﬁrm as a
whole. In particular, wage policies are mainly relevant at the ﬁrm level. Second,
it seems that when it is the ﬁrm that is at risk of closing, the unemployment
threat is stronger than when it is an establishment of a multi-plant ﬁrm. In
large multi-plant ﬁrms, plant shutdowns may be used in addition to layoﬀs as a
means of reducing capacity in face of unfavorable shocks in the product demand.
A plant shutdown may even occur with no layoﬀs, as workers from closing plants
are reemployed in other plants of the same ﬁrm. Indeed, in some situations the
shutdown of a plant may be a less costly bargaining strategy and, thus, would
be preferable to a wage concession strategy. The empirical evidence for Portugal
suggests that due to higher adjustment costs (mainly the costs of ﬁring workers)
and in the face of unforeseen temporary shocks, it is preferable for employers,
under certain circumstances, to close down instead of adjusting their level of
employment by laying oﬀ workers [Blanchard and Portugal (2001)].
3.2 The Empirical Model
The failure equation is speciﬁed as:
π∗
ijt = α1Xjt−1 +α2W∗
Rijt−1 +α3Φ(WMit−1) +υ1ijt (1),
where Yijt = 1 if π∗
ijt < 0 and Yijt = 0 if π∗
ijt ≥ 0.
π∗
ijt is a latent variable reﬂecting the future proﬁtability of ﬁrm j. In the data
it is not possible to observe π∗
ijt. All we can say is whether π∗
ijt is or is not
below a given threshold (the minimum level of proﬁts that guarantees the ﬁrm’s
continued existence). In the latter case, the ﬁrm will continue its operations,
otherwise it will close down. Thus, the dummy variable Yijt equals one if worker
i was displaced in year t due to ﬁrm closure, zero otherwise. The probability
of displacement through ﬁrm closing is deﬁned as Pijt ≡ Pr(π∗
ijt < 0). Xjt−1 is
a vector of ﬁrm and local labor market characteristics and W∗
Rijt−1 the natural
logarithm of the entry-level wage (reservation wage) paid to worker i by ﬁrm
j. We decided to include the level of reservation wages instead of the level of
wages per se in the failure equation in order to make comparisons across ﬁrms
less ambiguous. Adjusting the level of wages by subtracting the impact of tenure
circumvents the possibility that wages may be merely reﬂecting the impact of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investments on the failure rate.4 Φ(WMit−1) denotes
4To better understand the relationship between ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and plant clos-
ing see Hamermesh (1988).9
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1159
February 2010
the probability of a given worker receiving the minimum wage.5 α’s are the
parameters to be estimated and υ1ijt is a normally distributed random variable
with zero mean and unit variance.
This speciﬁcation is fundamentally diﬀerent from Hamermesh’s own empir-
ical failure equation. In fact, since a control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand shocks is
added to the failure equation deﬁned in (1), the probit equation merely captures
the eﬀect of the level of wages on the probability of closing. The failure equa-
tion gives, for each wage rate, the probability that the ﬁrm will close, holding
product demand shocks constant. In this sense, it can be viewed as a discrete
version of a labor demand equation. The eﬀect of the probability of closing on
wages is estimated in the market wage equation, which can be interpreted as a
discrete version of a labor supply equation.
Generically, the market-wage equation is deﬁned as:
W∗
ijt−1 = β1Zijt−1 +β2Ujt−1 +β3π∗
ijt+υ2ijt−1 (2).
where Wijt−1 = Max(WMit−1,W∗
ijt−1) and WMit−1 is the mandatory minimum
wage in period t − 1.
The wage paid to worker i in ﬁrm j is a function of a set of workers’ char-
acteristics included in vector Zij, local labor market characteristics deﬁned in
vector Uj and π∗
ij.6 β’s are the unknown parameters to be estimated and υ2ijt−1
is a normally distributed random variable (zero mean and constant variance).
4 The Data
4.1 Sample Description
The data set used in this study was obtained from Quadros de Pessoal (QP) and
includes all workers that lost their jobs in 1994, 1995 or 1996 due to ﬁrm closure
and were present in the QP registers in the year that preceded the displacement.
A control group made up of a random sample of workers who were employed in
the year prior to the displacement in ﬁrms that did not close in the following
year is also included.
QP is an annual mandatory employment survey collected by the Portuguese
Ministry of Employment, that covers virtually all ﬁrms employing paid labor
in Portugal.7 Each year, every establishment with wage earners in the private
sector is legally obliged to ﬁle a standardized questionnaire. Reported data cover
the establishment itself (location, economic activity and employment), the ﬁrm
5Even though minimum wage earners can be identiﬁed directly, the estimated probability
of a given worker receiving the minimum wage will be included in the probit equation in order
to account for the endogeneity of wages, including minimum wages.
6Notice that since a control for tenure in the job will be included in the wage equation it
is indiﬀerent, from a theoretical point of view, whether the dependent variable is deﬁned as
the level of wages (W) or the excess of wages over the reservation wage (W − WR).
7Thus, this source does not cover operated family businesses without wage-earning em-
ployees and self-employment. Public administration is also excluded.10
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(location, economic activity, employment, sales and legal framework) and each
of its workers (gender, age, education, skill, occupation, tenure, earnings and
duration of work).
Each ﬁrm entering the database is assigned a diﬀerent identiﬁcation number
and the Ministry implements several checks to ensure that a ﬁrm that has al-
ready reported to the database is not assigned a diﬀerent identiﬁcation number.
In particular, an exit from the database should signal a ﬁrm that has ceased its
activity. This criteria, however, is not entirely accurate, due to the fact that
some of the ﬁrms temporarily exit the database. A temporary exit may occur
for a number of reasons other than cessation of activity, a very likely reason
being that the survey form was not received in the Ministry of Employment
before the date when the recording operations were closed. Almost all of these
temporary exits last less than two years, but can still cause an identiﬁcation
problem if they occur in the terminal years. In order to account for this prob-
lem, the information on the last two years after displacement was used solely to
control for temporary exits in the intermediate years.8 To ensure that we are
in the presence of ﬁrms’ true closures and not mergers or acquisitions, we also
excluded from the sample those workers that appeared in the database in the
period after displacement with a year of admission in the new job less than the
year of displacement minus one.9
The survey has three characteristics that make it particularly suitable for the
analysis of the relationship between wages and the risk of ﬁrm closing. The ﬁrst
is its coverage. By law, the questionnaire is made available to every worker in a
public space of the establishment. This requirement facilitates the work of the
services of the Ministry of Employment that monitor compliance of ﬁrms with
the law (e. g., illegal work). The administrative nature of the data and its public
availability implies a high degree of coverage and reliability. Second, this survey
is conducted on a yearly basis and since unique identiﬁers are available for both
ﬁrms and workers, ﬁrms and individuals can be tracked over the years. Third,
it contains a rich set of information on both ﬁrms and its workers, which will
enable us to address a number of questions that cannot be adequately answered
in the absence of ﬁrm or worker data.
In order to be allowed to construct the variables that account for ﬁrm’s re-
cent evolution, we impose that workers be present in the QP registers in each of
the three years that preceded the ﬁrm shutdown and employed with the same
employer over those years.10 This requirement means that an individual must
have at least two years of tenure in the year prior to displacement. This selection
rule, although primarily dictated by data availability considerations, results in
8Since we have information over the 1991-1998 period, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as an exiting ﬁrm
in 1996 if it is present in the QP ﬁles in 1995, but absent in 1996, 1997 and 1998. The same
reasoning applies for exits in 1994 and 1995.
9If, for example, a worker’s displacement year is 1994 and he (she) appears in the database
in the post-displacement period with a year of admission in the new job of 1992 or less, he
(she) is excluded from the sample.
10Hence, for workers displaced in 1994 the data should be available for the 1991-93 period,
for workers displaced in 1995 for the period of 1992-94 and for workers displaced in 1996 for
the 1993-95 period.11
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an overrepresentation of employed individuals with a stable contractual rela-
tionship.11 Nevertheless, this restriction should not be of greater concern since
the possibility of wage concessions is particularly relevant for workers with a
higher employment attachment. On average, the sampled individuals have 26
years of labor force experience and over 11 years of employer tenure.
We also limited the sample to full-time workers aged between 18 and 64 in
the year prior to displacement. Since the minimum wage is deﬁned as a monthly
wage, the full-time job requirement allows us to identify minimum wage earners
more accurately.12 In this context, wages are measured as monthly wages.
We have also excluded those individuals for whom information was incom-
plete for the year before displacement (or for the three years before displacement
in the case of the variable sales), namely those with no reported wage. Finally,
and in order to minimize the eﬀects of the presence of outliers, we drop the 0.1%
top and the 0.1% bottom observations for the wage and sales variables.
After these exclusions we obtained a sample of 35,922 full-time workers that
were displaced between 1994-96 due to ﬁrm closing, aged between 18-64 and
with at least two years of tenure in the year prior to displacement.
The control group includes three sub-samples and was constructed in the
following way. For each year prior to the displacement year we obtained a
random sample of around 300,000 workers that were employed in ﬁrms that did
not close.13 For each of these three groups we excluded those individuals that
were not present in the QP ﬁles in each of the three years before displacement
and those who were not employed in the same ﬁrm over those years. The sample
was also limited to full-time workers aged between 18-64 in the year prior to
displacement. After excluding those observations with missing values on the
explanatory variables and the extreme observations (outliers) for wages and
sales, we obtained a control group of 230,102 non-displaced workers.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample for the two groups
of workers: displaced and non-displaced. As shown in Table 1, on average, dis-
placed workers are slightly younger, less qualiﬁed and with fewer years of tenure
and education. They also earn, on average, less than non-displaced workers.
The subsample of displaced workers includes more females and minimum wage
earners.
According to ﬁrms’ characteristics, the proportion of displaced workers that
comes from small, young and single-plant ﬁrms is higher when compared to the
sample of non-displaced workers. For the former the real average growth rate of
ﬁrms’ sales in the last three years is negative (-7.6%), while for the latter that
same rate is positive (1.4%). Displaced workers are also employed in ﬁrms with
a reduced market power (as measured by market share).
11We also believe that this restriction minimizes a potential selectivity problem generated
by the (possibly non-random) departure of workers before closure.
12See Appendix A for a more detailed description of the minimum wage legislation in Por-
tugal.
13The sample was drawn using a random number generator.12
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics (Means and Standard Deviations)
Displaced Non-displaced
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Workers’ Characteristics
Age (in years) 37.3 0.113 38.5 0.107
Tenure (in years) 9.8 0.082 11.9 0.085
Education (in years) 5.8 2.830 6.4 3.231
Proportion of Female 0.442 0.368
Proportion of Minimum Wage Earners 0.143 0.056
Qualiﬁcation Levels (proportion of workers)
Top Executives 0.018 0.029
Intermediary Executives 0.017 0.031
Supervisors 0.051 0.057
Highly Skilled and Skilled Professionals 0.527 0.543




Size (total employment) 108.4 426.2 1135.1 2701.2
Past Sales Growth -0.076 0.391 0.014 0.354
Market Share 0.013 0.060 0.118 0.250
Proportion of Foreign Capital 0.031 0.161 0.094 0.269
Proportion of Multi-plant Firms 0.165 0.413
Firm Age (proportion of workers)
2-5 years 0.134 0.046
6-10 years 0.181 0.086
> 10 years 0.685 0.869
Real Sales per Worker (in logs) 8.419 1.111 8.825 1.172
Real Monthly Wage (in logs) 10.973 0.432 11.175 0.490
Number of Observations 35,922 230,102
Notes: (a) all variables, except past sales growth, are measured in the year prior to
displacement; (b) sales per worker and the monthly wage are in 1991 PTE (escudo);
1 EURO≡200.482 PTE.13
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The dependent variable in the failure equation is a binary variable that takes
the value of one if the worker was displaced in year t due to ﬁrm closure, zero
otherwise. A set of ﬁrm variables that may aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision to close
are identiﬁed below.
In order to control the exogenous demand shocks that may aﬀect the proba-
bility of ﬁrm closing, the average growth rate of real sales in the last three years
is used as a proxy for ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks.14 Controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc (idio-
syncratic) shocks enables one to examine whether, in the face of an identical
exogenous shock, and all else being equal, ﬁrms with lower wages are less likely
to close down or not.
Even though ﬁrm demand shifts certainly aﬀect the rate of ﬁrm closing,
other forces are also at work. Jovanovic (1982) showed that patterns of employer
growth and ﬁrm (plant) failure are consistent with a process of within-industry
selection in which ineﬃcient producers decline and fail. This selection process
leads to substantial variation in the probability of exit across ﬁrms (plants)
within an industry. In fact, while plant deaths are part of the normal process of
the entry and exit of ﬁrms, the post-entry patterns of growth and failure vary
considerably with employers’ observed characteristics [Dunne et al. (1989)].
This reasoning suggests that the risk of displacement due to ﬁrm closing varies
not only with the demand for the ﬁrm’s output but also with employer’s eﬃ-
ciency relative to competing ﬁrms in the same industry. In this sense, a set of
ﬁrm characteristics that are related to its performance in the output market may
aﬀect the ﬁrm’s own probability of survival. The factors to be included in the
empirical model as exit determinants will now be identiﬁed. With the exception
of past sales growth, all variables are measured in the year that precedes the
potential exit event (period t-1).
It has been largely shown in the empirical literature on ﬁrm survival that ﬁrm
size and ﬁrm age are negatively associated with failure rates [see, for example,
Kumar (1985), Evans (1987), Hall (1987), Dunne et al. (1989), Audretsch
and Mahmood (1994), Mata and Portugal (1994) and Mata et al. (1995)].
These results are consistent with Jovanovic’s (1982) model of industry evolution,
according to which ﬁrms start with no knowledge about their eﬃciency. As
time goes by and ﬁrms observe their performance in the product market, they
gradually learn about their eﬃciency. This information is then incorporated
into their current size. Eﬃcient ﬁrms grow and survive, while ineﬃcient ones
contract and fail. Thus, large and old ﬁrms are successful ﬁrms, and, for this
reason, they should have higher survival probabilities. Measures of the size and
age of the ﬁrm are, thus, included in the failure equation. The size of the ﬁrm is
deﬁned as the natural logarithm of its total employment. Since the information
about the date of a ﬁrm’s creation is only available after 1993, and in order to
14Sales in year t correspond to annual sales of the previous year. Sales were deﬂated using
the CPI (base=1991).14
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use the same criteria to measure age in the 1993-95 period, we used as a proxy
for ﬁrm age the tenure (in years) of the worker with the longest tenure within
the ﬁrm.15 A linear spline function is used to deﬁne the eﬀect of the age of the
ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm’s market share is used as a measure of product market competition.
Monopoly power generates monopoly rents and consequently higher proﬁts. If
employers are able to appropriate part of these rents, it should be expected that
ﬁrms with increased market share are less likely to fail. The market share is
obtained by the ratio between a ﬁrm’s sales and total (5 digit) industry sales.
Firm ownership characteristics may aﬀect the exit likelihood. Two indicators
of ownership type will be used, namely the number of establishments with which
each ﬁrm operates and the proportion of foreign capital. For the former a
dummy variable that takes the value one if the ﬁrm is a multi-plant ﬁrm (0
otherwise) will be included in the model. Even though the empirical evidence
suggests that multi-plant ﬁrms use the shutdown margin more often than their
single-plant counterparts, it seems reasonable to admit that exit of a multi-plant
ﬁrm is less likely since it implies the simultaneous failure of all its plants [see
Mata and Portugal (1994), Machin (1995) and the recent studies of Addison et
al. (2004) and Bernard and Jensen (2002)].
The proportion of foreign capital may itself be an indicator of the ﬁrm’s
unobserved managerial ability and may aﬀect the probability of closure. Doms
and Jensen (1998) found that multinational plants have superior observable
characteristics. But, it is also well known that multinationals have a higher
propensity to relocate production within ﬁrms, which may lead to an increased
probability of closure [see, for example, Harris and Hassaszadeh (2002)].
To analyze the eﬀects of individual wage levels on the probability of ﬁrm
closing, it is necessary to use a measure of revenue per employee in order to be
able to compare ﬁrms. Firms that have higher variable costs, holding revenue
ﬁxed, are less likely to cover their ﬁxed costs in the long-run and thus more
likely to close down. Real sales per worker (in logs) is used as a measure of
ﬁrm’s revenue per employee.
Finally, and in order to control for local labor market conditions, a set of
industry (one-digit) and regional dummies (Nuts II), as well as the regional
unemployment rate, are included in the failure equation.16,17 Since the data in-
clude ﬁrm closures that occurred in 1994, 1995 and 1996, two time dummies were
also added to the model in order to control for aggregate economic conditions.
4.2.2 Wage Equation
The dependent variable in the wage equation is deﬁned as the natural loga-
rithm of the real monthly base wage paid to an individual worker in the year
15This solution has been largely adopted and validated by other studies that use the QP
data set.
16At one-digit level there are nine sectors according to the Portuguese Classiﬁcation of
Economic Activities (CAE).
17At Nuts II mainland Portugal is split into 5 geographical areas.15
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that precedes the displacement. The monthly base wage was deﬂated by the
Consumer Price Index (CPI; base=1991). The reservation wage is measured as
the monthly base wage minus an adjustment equal to the eﬀect of tenure (and
its square) on wages.
The wage equation includes a set of controls for personal characteristics such
as: gender (female=1), education (in years), age and its square (in years), tenure
and its square (in years) and qualiﬁcation level. A set of dummies are used
for the levels of qualiﬁcation. Seven categories are considered: top executives,
intermediary executives, supervisors, highly skilled and skilled professionals,
semi-skilled and unskilled professionals, non-deﬁned (a residual category) and
apprentices (the reference category).
In order to assure that the eﬀect of a higher risk of unemployment on wages is
due to ﬁrm shutdown and not to diﬀerences in the risk of layoﬀ in the local labor
markets, the local unemployment rate is used to control for those diﬀerences.
The local unemployment rate is deﬁned at the disaggregated level of Nuts III.18
A set of industry (one-digit), regional (Nuts II) and time dummies are also
added to the wage equation.
18It should be noted that for the period of analysis of this study (1993-95), unemployment
rates are only deﬁned at the regional level at Nuts II. In order to have a proxy for unemploy-
ment at a more disaggregated level of Nuts III (28 geographical areas for mainland), the ratio
between annual job applications registered in each employment center and total employment
(deﬁned at Nuts III using data from QP) will be used.
The information on job applications registered in each employment center was obtained
from Monthly Statistics - Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (IEFP).16
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5 Estimation and Empirical Results
5.1 Estimation Procedure
In order to estimate the simultaneous-equations model of ﬁrm closing and wages
presented in Section 3, it will be necessary to choose an adequate method of
estimation. It is well known that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is,
in general, inconsistent when applied to a structural equation in a simultaneous-
equations system.
Beyond this diﬃculty, our empirical model of ﬁrm closing and wages is non-
standard, since one of the endogenous variables is a binary variable while the
other is a censored variable. In fact, while the failure equation is speciﬁed as a
probit model, the wage equation is a tobit model with lower censoring at the
minimum wage. Thus, we are in the presence of a simultaneous-equations model
with mixed dichotomous and censored variables.
The conventional method for estimating simultaneous-equations models is
the method of instrumental variables. As suggested by Maddala (1983), a two-
stage procedure will allow us to estimate a two-equation model in which one
of the variables is censored while the other is only observed as a dichotomous
variable. The two-stage estimation method involves the following steps. The
ﬁrst step is to write the reduced-forms equations for the endogenous variables.
Next, estimate the reduced-forms equations and keep the predicted values. Fi-
nally, estimate the structural equations replacing the endogenous variables by
the predicted values obtained from the reduced-forms regressions.
The empirical model deﬁned by equations (1) and (2) speciﬁes both the
probability of closure and wages as endogenous. Hence, the reduced form of the
equation system in the latent variables is:
π∗
ijt = Π1Kijt−1 + ε1ijt, Yijt = 1(π∗
ijt < 0) (3),
W∗
ijt−1 = Π2Kijt−1+ε2ijt−1, Wijt−1 = Max(WMit−1,W∗
ijt−1) (4).
where K includes all the exogenous variables in X,Z, and U.
The reduced-form parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood
methods applied to the probit and tobit models in equations (3) and (4), re-
spectively.
Estimating the reduced-form for π∗
ijt by the probit method will allow us
to obtain the predicted probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing, ￿ P.
Estimating the reduced-form for W∗
ijt−1 by the tobit method will enable us
to obtain the predicted value of the monthly wage (￿ W∗) and the estimated
probability that a given observation is a limit observation, Φ(￿ WM). In other
words, Φ(￿ WM) measures the estimated probability of a given worker receiving
the minimum wage.17
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This procedure is unconventional, but provides a simple and elegant solution
to the speciﬁcation of the two sources of endogeneity from wages to failure rates.
On the one hand, the impact of the level of wages on the chances of ﬁrm closure,
and, on the other, the inﬂuence of minimum wage restrictions on the ability to
accommodate negative shocks.
The structural wage equation is estimated in the second-stage tobit after re-
placing the probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing (P) by its predicted
value (￿ P). The structural failure equation is estimated in the second-stage pro-
bit after replacing the monthly reservation wage (W∗
R) by its predicted value
￿ W∗
R = ￿ W∗−(ˆ π21Tenure−ˆ π22Tenure2) and after including the estimated prob-
ability of being a minimum wage earner, Φ(￿ WM).19 This last procedure will
enable us to examine the eﬀect of a mandatory minimum wage on the failure
rate.
5.2 Identiﬁability Issues
The speciﬁcation of our simultaneous equation model is based, as usual, on a
delicate compromise between parsimony, on the one hand, and the informational
limitations of the data, on the other. It has to be admitted from the outset that
the identiﬁcation obtained from the non-linearities of the model, while helpful,
is not fully convincing. Apart from this source of identiﬁcation, we rely on the
information of the ﬁrm’s past sales growth as an indication of exogenous demand
shocks which arguably aﬀect the closure decision but not the wage equation.
What is assumed is that past sales growth solely impact on wages through the
increase of the probability of ﬁrm closure (raising the "fear of unemployment"
and weakening workers’ bargaining power). In short, we are using past sales
growth as a valid instrument for the probability of closure and we are conﬁdent
that the unemployment threat can be legitimately captured in the probability
of closure.
By the same token, we included the worker qualiﬁcation levels, which are
used to deﬁne the base wages determined by collective bargaining, in the wage
equation but not in the failure equation. We are fairly conﬁdent that this classiﬁ-
cation is orthogonal to the exit decision by the ﬁrm, being, in our interpretation,
a proxy for bargained wages. We also made, with some trepidation, additional
exclusion restrictions: in essence, we excluded from the wage equation variables
characterizing the ﬁrm and we excluded worker variables from the failure equa-
tion. These restrictions are admittedly ad-hoc but do not play any decisive role
in the estimation results as we shall see.
19The estimates of the tenure coeﬃcients (ˆ π21and ˆ π22) were obtained with the estimation
of the reduced form for W∗.18
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The parameter estimates of the simultaneous-equations model of ﬁrm closing
and wages are presented in Tables 2 (structural failure equation) and 3 (struc-
tural wage equation).20 The estimation strategy consists of having, as far as
possible, a complete set of controls to examine whether a robust association
between wages and the probability of ﬁrm closing (and vice-versa) can be iden-
tiﬁed.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 report results (coeﬃcients estimates and mar-
ginal eﬀects, respectively) for a speciﬁcation in which the probability of ﬁrm
closing depends on an extensive set of ﬁrm characteristics, the regional unem-
ployment rate, monthly reservation wage (predicted) and the estimated proba-
bility of being a minimum wage earner. A set of dummy variables for industries,
regions and years are also included.
High-wage paying ﬁrms face higher hazard rates than low-paying ﬁrms, ce-
teris paribus. After controlling for an extensive set of employers’ characteristics
and for local labor market conditions, the results reveal that ﬁrms that pay
higher entry-level wages, holding revenue per employee ﬁxed, are less likely to
survive. In fact, the marginal eﬀect of a 10% increase on the monthly reserva-
tion wage in the probability of displacement is 0.1 percentage points (see column
2 of Table 2). Since the average job displacement rate through ﬁrm closing in
the population is around 6.3%, a 10% wage increase is associated with a 1.6%
increase in the probability of job displacement through ﬁrm closing.
The evidence of a positive relationship between reservation wages and failure
rates is consistent with the idea of higher entry-level wages due to the existence
of compensating diﬀerentials for the ex ante risk of displacement, which may
accelerate the closure process in the short-run. Alternatively, it may merely
reﬂect the scarcity of labor.
Finally, the two-step probit results report a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of
the probability of receiving the minimum wage on the failure rate, suggesting
that ﬁrms with a higher incidence of minimum wage workers face higher exit
rates than those with a smaller incidence. A one percentage point increase in the
proportion of minimum wage earners increases the probability of displacement
by 0.029 percentage points. Since, on average, the proportion of minimum wage
earners in the population is around 13% and the average job displacement rate
is 6.3%, a 10% increase in the proportion of minimum wage earners increases
the probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing by 0.60%.
In fact, the possibility of wage concessions is precluded if workers are paid
legal minimum wages. Thus, ﬁrms with a higher proportion of minimum wage
earners may have lower chances of survival due to their inability to adjust wages
downward in the face of a negative demand shock.
Past sales growth, ﬁrm size, age, market share, multi-plant ﬁrm, proportion
20In both equations the asymptotic t-ratios correspond to the corrected covariance matrix
for the two-step estimator using the methodology developed by Murphy and Topel (1985).19
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of foreign capital and sales per worker are signiﬁcantly correlated with the prob-
ability of ﬁrm closing. In particular, the results reveal that ﬁrms experiencing a
decline in sales growth are clearly more likely to close. This seems to imply that
sales contraction can be used as a strong predictor of ﬁrm failure. Indeed, the
fact that a ﬁrm has grown in the past signals that it has been performing well.
Moreover, the estimates reported in Table 2 show that small ﬁrms are clearly
more likely to close than large ﬁrms. This result is conventional enough and, in
particular, is in line with the one obtained for Portugal in the study of Mata et
al. (1995) using a sample of newly born manufacturing plants.
The estimates of the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrm’s age using splines indicate a
negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect of age on the probability of displacement. How-
ever, after a decade, the negative eﬀect of age starts to vanish, becoming slightly
positive for very old ﬁrms (more than 54 years).
The variable market share has a strong negative eﬀect on the probability of
closing, suggesting that monopoly power generates rents that may function as
a buﬀer that cushions against negative shocks.
As expected, workers that are part of a multi-plant ﬁrm are less likely to be
displaced due to ﬁrm closing than workers that are part of a single-plant ﬁrm.
The same is true for workers that are part of ﬁrms with a large proportion of
foreign-owned capital.
Sales per worker, a proxy for productivity, have a negative impact on the
probability of ﬁrm closing. Thus, low productivity ﬁrms, all else being equal,
are more likely to close down.
The coeﬃcient estimate of the regional unemployment rate is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that local economic conditions may aﬀect the
viability of some types of ﬁrms.20
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Table 2: Failure Equation - Two-step Probit Results
Full-time Workers (N=266,024)
Dependent variable: displaced=1
Variables Coeﬃcient Marginal Eﬀect
Past Sales Growth -0.327* -0.049
(-31.1)









Market Share -1.436* -0.217
(-29.0)
Multi-plant Firm -0.066* -0.010
(-6.9)
Proportion of Foreign Capital -0.206* -0.031
(-11.4)
Sales per Worker -0.055* -0.008
(-13.8)
Regional Unemployment Rate 0.055* 0.008
(7.3)
Monthly Reservation Wage (predicted) 0.063* 0.010
(3.2)






Notes: (a) a set of industry, regional and time dummies are included in the speciﬁcation;
(b) AgeS5=(Age-5) if Age>5, 0 otherwise; AgeS10=(Age-10) if Age>10, 0 otherwise;
(c) asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses;
(d) * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.21
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Table 3 reports the two-step tobit results of the wage equation. The basic
speciﬁcation includes a set of controls for workers’ characteristics, the regional
unemployment rate and the (instrumented) probability of displacement due to
ﬁrm closing. A set of industry, regional and time dummies are also included
in the speciﬁcation. All the exogenous variables (excluding tenure squared) are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level of signiﬁcance and have the expected
signs.
The eﬀect of the probability of closing on monthly wages is negative and
also statistically signiﬁcant. Converting the coeﬃcient of -0.892 to an elasticity
results in a value of -0.056 evaluated at the mean failure rate in the sample
(i. e. 6.3%). This implies that if the probability of displacement doubles,
say from 6.3% to 12.6%, wages decrease by 5.6%, all else being equal.21 This
empirical result indicates that average wages grow less rapidly in plants that will
soon close, suggesting that ﬁrms’ adjustment to negative shocks are partially
absorbed into wages.22
21If ￿ W0 is the predicted wage in a ﬁrm with an average failure probability of 0.063 and ￿ W1
is the predicted wage in a ﬁrm with a double probability of failure, then the relative wage
diﬀerential is calculated as ln( ￿ W1/￿ W0) = [(−0.892) ∗ (0.063)] = −0.056.
22It should be noted that in Portugal nominal wage reductions are forbidden. Periods of
high inﬂation favor, of course, larger downward real wage adjustments. In the period under
analysis, inﬂation rates reached 8.1% in 1993, 6.1% in 1994 and 4.6% in 1995.22
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Table 3: Wage Equation - Two-step Tobit Results
Full-time Workers (N=266,024)
Dependent variable: log of real monthly wage











Tenure/100 Squared -0.093 -0.088
(-0.8)
Qualiﬁcation Levels
Top Executives 0.762* 0.728
(62.4)




Highly Skilled and Skilled Professionals 0.214* 0.204
(33.7)




Regional Unemployment Rate -0.058* -0.056
(-25.1)






Notes: (a) a set of industry, regional and time dummies are included in the speciﬁcation;
(b) asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses;
(c) * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.23
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5.3.2 Robustness Checks: Alternative Speciﬁcations
At this point it should be noted that our main results remain valid regardless of
changes in the model speciﬁcation. In fact, to further evaluate the robustness
of our results, namely their sensitivity to changes in speciﬁcation, our model
was reestimated including a detailed set of workers’ characteristics in the failure
equation following previous studies such as Cooper et al. (1994) and Mata and
Portugal (2002), who found human capital to be a good predictor of survival.
The results reported in column 1 of Table 4 show that including a set of con-
trols for workers’ characteristics (such as gender, age, education and tenure) in
the failure equation does not aﬀect our previous results. Indeed, this change
increases the positive impact of wages on the probability of closing, suggesting
that wages may be correlated with workers’ characteristics across ﬁrms. More-
over, and even though the impact of the proportion of minimum wage earners
in the ﬁrm is reduced, it remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the
conventional levels.23
Some other alternative speciﬁcations were tested, namely with the intro-
duction, in the wage equation, of ﬁrms’ characteristics that might constitute an
important determinant of wages, such as size and sales per worker. Again, these
changes did not alter our main qualitative results (see column 2 of Table 4).24
Finally, it should be pointed out that the eﬀect of wages and the proportion
of minimum wage earners in the failure equation remains virtually unchanged
if the level of wages is measured as the monthly base wage with no correction
for tenure eﬀects (see column 3 of Table 4).
In sum, these robustness checks reveal that the relationships between wages
(including minimum wages) and the risk of displacement are robust to the in-
clusion of workers’ and ﬁrms’ characteristics in the failure and wage equation,
respectively, i. e., our main conclusions stand regardless to changes in the model
speciﬁcation.
23See Table A.1 of Appendix B for the full results of the failure equation.
24See Table A.2 of Appendix B for the full results of the wage equation.24
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Table 4: Robustness Checks - Two-step Results (coeﬃcient estimates)
Full-time Workers (N=266,024)
Failure Equation Wage Equation
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Probability of Displacement (predicted) -0.933 -0.479 -0.933
(-75.7) (-37.0) (-75.7)
Monthly Reservation Wage (predicted) 0.251 0.063
(8.3) (3.2)
Φ(WM) (predicted) 0.080 0.192 0.181
(2.2) (5.9) (5.4)
Monthly Wage (predicted) 0.052
(2.6)
Notes: (i) speciﬁcation (1) includes a set of human capital variables (gender, education, tenure
and its square, age dummies in the failure equation; speciﬁcation (2) includes ﬁrm size and
sales per worker in the wage equation; speciﬁcation (3) uses the monthly wage instead of the
monthly reservation wage in the failure equation; (ii) asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses;
(iii) all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% or 5% level.25
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated how wages adjust to unfavorable shocks
that raise the risk of displacement through ﬁrm closing, and to what extent
a wage change aﬀects the exit likelihood. For this purpose, a simultaneous-
equations model was speciﬁed and tested using a large longitudinally linked
employer-employee data set of workers displaced due to ﬁrm closing. Three
main conclusions emerge from this exercise.
First, after controlling for employers’ heterogeneity and local labor market
conditions, the results indicated that, although modest, wages have a positive
impact on the failure rate. High-wage paying ﬁrms face higher exit rates than
low-paying ﬁrms, ceteris paribus. Indeed, a 10% increase in monthly reservation
wages raises the probability of displacement through ﬁrm closing by 1.6%.
Second, a negative and strong eﬀect of the probability of closing on wages
was found, favoring the hypothesis that the risk of unemployment depresses
wages. Doubling the average risk of displacement depresses wages by around
6%. This robust empirical evidence reinforces the hypothesis that under a bar-
gaining approach workers in ﬁrms at risk are able to agree upon wage conces-
sions/moderation in order to avoid the ﬁrm’s shutdown.
Third, minimum wage restrictions were seen to increase the failure rates. A
high proportion of minimum wage earners in a ﬁrm may preclude the possibility
of wage concessions in response to unfavorable shocks, and thus accelerate the
exit decision. In other words, ﬁrms with a higher incidence of minimum wage
earners are more vulnerable to adverse demand shocks due to their inability to
adjust wages downward. In fact, beyond the direct eﬀect of wages on the failure
rate, a 10% increase in the incidence of minimum wage earners (just around 1.3
percentage points) raises the probability of displacement by 0.6%.26
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APPENDIX A - Minimum Wage Legislation
A mandatory minimum monthly wage was set for the ﬁrst time in Portugal in
1974, covering workers aged 20 or older and excluding agriculture and domestic
servants. Currently, there is a unique legal minimum that applies to all workers.
Workers formally classiﬁed as apprentices receive just 80% of the full rate. The
minimum pay cannot be reduced by means of collective agreements or individual
contracts.
The minimum wage is deﬁned as the base monthly wage and is updated
annually by the parliament, under government proposal.25 Decisions on the
level of the minimum wage are taken on a discretionary basis, usually taking
into account past and predicted inﬂation and after consulting the social partners.
According to the 1998 annual report of the Bank of Portugal (1999), in 1995,
the minimum monthly wage represents around 43% of the average monthly base
wage in the private sector. Data for 1995 also indicate that the proportion of
workers that received the minimum legal wage or a subminimum was about
13%, although this percentage has steadily declined since 1985.
The coverage of the legal minimum wage is maximum in the furniture in-
dustries and in the sector of restaurants and hotels (coverage higher than 20%
in 1995). Coverage is also larger in ﬁrms employing fewer than 10 employees.26
25The only exceptions are 1982, when it was not updated, and 1989, when it was updated
twice.
26Source: Earnings Survey - Statistics Department of the Ministery of Employment.27
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APPENDIX B
Table A.1: Failure Equation - Two-step Probit Results
Full-time Workers (N=266,024)
Dependent variable: displaced=1
Variables Coeﬃcient Marginal Eﬀect
Past Sales Growth -0.322* -0.048
(-30.7)









Market Share -1.386* -0.208
(-28.4)
Multi-plant Firm -0.066* -0.010
(-6.9)
Proportion of Foreign Capital -0.248* -0.037
(-13.4)
Sales per Worker -0.070* -0.010
(-15.8)















Tenure/100 Squared 4.442 0.668
(10.0)28
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Table A.1 (continued)
Monthly Reservation Wage (predicted) 0.251* 0.038
(8.3)






Notes: (a) a set of industry, regional and time dummies are included in the speciﬁcation;
(b) AgeS5=(Age-5) if Age>5, 0 otherwise; AgeS10=(Age-10) if Age>10, 0 otherwise;
(c) asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses;
(d) * (**) statistically signiﬁcant at 1% (5%).29
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Table A.2: Wage Equation - Two-step Tobit Results
Full-time Workers (N=266,024)
Dependent variable: log of real monthly wage











Tenure/100 Squared -0.492* -0.472
(-5.3)
Qualiﬁcation Levels
Top Executives 0.742* 0.712
(101.5)




Highly Skilled and Skilled Professionals 0.198* 0.190
(43.5)




Regional Unemployment Rate -0.060* -0.058
(-35.9)
Sales per Worker 0.070* 0.067
(90.2)
Firm Size 0.016* 0.016
(23.8)






Notes: (a) a set of industry, regional and time dummies are included in the speciﬁcation;
(b) asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses;
(c) * statistically signiﬁcant at 1%.30
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